Social Decision Considering Subjective Feelings (Mathematical Analysis of Uncertainty and Decision Making) by Nakai, Teruhisa
Title Social Decision Considering Subjective Feelings(Mathematical Analysis of Uncertainty and Decision Making)
Author(s)Nakai, Teruhisa




Type Departmental Bulletin Paper
Textversionpublisher
Kyoto University
Social Decision Considering Subjective Feelings
(Teruhisa Nakai)
Faculty of Environmental and Urban Engineering
Kansai University
Abstract. As a method of obtaining a fair social decision, we propose the fuzzy so-
cial decision procedure in which each member can choose freely appraisal criteria for
his preferences and, taking the ambiguity of human judgement into consideration, the
comprehensive evaluation for each alternative is made by a fuzzy integral.
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1 Introduction
The main subject in the social decision theory is as follows : How should we put
together opinions of all members in order to obtain a fair social decision? As a method
of compiling opinions various voting systems are used. The most popular voting system
is the majority rule in which each voter writes the most favorable alternative and an
altemative obtained the maximum number of votes wins. Since this system is simple in
both voting and counting votes, it is well-used, but it is an excessive simplification of
information to take only the best alternative into consideration. In actuality the voter
who hesitates between the first and the second alternatives, has dissatisfaction with the
ignoration of the second altemative.
As a voting system considering all preference orders of each voter, the Condorcet
procedure and the Borda procedure have been proposed. The Condorcet procedure
decides the social preference order for all alternatives by collecting the social preference
for each pair of altematives which is decided by the majority rule by all voters. But it is
well-known that the Condorcet procedure may result in the ’ voting paradox”, that is,
the cyclic preference order occurs and then the social preference order can’t be decided.
On the other hand, in the Borda procedure points are allocated to each alternative
according to the preference order of each voter, that is, in the case of $m$ altematives,
an altemative with the k-th preference order is allocated $(m-k+1)$ points. The social
preference order for altematives is decided in order of the sum of allocated points. For
the Borda procedure the following characteristics are well-known.
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(1) Each votcr must dccidc thc prefcrcncc order for all altcrnatives, but the differ-
ence between neighbouring orders is always one. Then the Borda procedure can’t
represent strictly the degree of strength of preference.
(2) When the set of alternatives varies, it may occur that the social preference order
among old altematives varies.
(3) A desirable social decision procedure must have the property of duality, that is,
when all preference orders of all voters are reversed, the social preference order must
not be the same as before. But the Borda procedure doesn’t have this property.
(4) Under the Borda procedure, it may occur that in order to make the specific al-
ternative the social selection a certain voter varies his own preference orders and
succeeds.
In general both the Condorcet and the Borda procedures consider not the strength it-
self but the order only of preference and then can’t represent true preferences strictly.
Moreover under these procedures the appraisal criteria are not taken up positively. Dis-
cussions of the various voting systems are shown in D.Black [1].
We propose the fuzzy social decision (FSD) procedure with the following characteris-
tics:
(1) We take up appraisal criteria positively and let each member select them freely.
(2) Each member puts subjective weights among his own appraisal criteria.
(3) Taking the ambiguity of appraisal into consideration, the fuzzy integral is used in
a comprehensive evaluation of an alternative by each member.
(4) The social decision is made by not the preference order but the sum of strengths
of preference.
For making a social decision, traditional procedures require each member to express his
own preference order for all altematives, but the FSD procedure goes into the details
of the process of individual preference, considers the subjectivity and the fuzziness in
evaluations and makes a social decision by strengths of preferences. Then the FSD
procedure is expected to solve many weak points of traditional procedures. Comparing
the FSD procedure with the majority rule, it is sure that the FSD procedure imposes
more burdens on both members and counters. But since it has respect for the subjective
preference by each member as much as possible, it is worth adopting as occasion calls.
2 The FSD procedure
A society being composed of many members wants to decide the social preference
order for many alternatives. Each member has allotted points according to his social
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position and allocates them among altematives. To compile individual preferences of all
members we propose the FSD procedure which details are as follows:
Step 1: Each member enumerates appraisal criteria for deciding his preferences. He
can choose freely the number and contents of the criteria.
Step 2: As the AHP (Analytic Hierarchy Process: T.L.Saaty [3]) method, each member
repeats paired comparisons among his appraisal criteria. As a result, his uncon-
scious subjective weights on criteria are clarified. Moreover the consistency among
paired comparisons is verified.
Step 3: Subjective weights on criteria are transformed into a fuzzy measure. In the
case of a $\lambda$-fuzzy measure, in order to decide the value of parameter $\lambda$ , in addition
the member is asked his weight of a certain set of alternatives.
Step 4: Each member marks all alternatives under each of his own appraisal criteria.
In this occasion maximum marks must be all the same.
Step 5: Considering the fuzziness of human judgement, the comprehensive evaluation
of each alternative is made according to a fuzzy integral of marks with respect to
the fuzzy measure mentioned in step 3.
Step 6: Each member allocates his allotted points to all alternatives in proportion to
comprehensive evaluations.
Step 7: The score of each alternative is decided by summing up points allocated by all
members.
Step 8: The social preference order follows the order of scores.
Tasks of each member are as follows:
Enumerating criteria (stepl), Paired comparisons (step2),
Answering the question to decide the parameter $\lambda$ (step3),
Marking an altemative under each criterion (step4)
Other tasks are carried out by the election committee.
Here we show the definition of a fuzzy measure (L.A.Zadeh[5]). We consider a finite
set $X=\{x_{1}, \cdots, x_{n}\}$ and let $A,$ $B$ be subsets of $X$ .
Definition 1. If a set function $g(\cdot)$ on the family of subsets of $X$ satisfys the following
conditions, it is called a fuzzy measure on $X$ .
(i) $g(\phi)=0,$ $g(X)=1$
where $\phi$ is a null set.
(ii) $A\subseteq B\Rightarrow g(A)\leq g(B)$ (monotonicity).
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Definition 2. For a constant $\lambda(>-1)$ , if a fuzzy measure $g_{\lambda}(\cdot)$ on $X$ satisfys the
following condition, it is called a $\lambda$-fuzzy measure.
(iii) For any subsets $A$ and $B$ of $X(A\cap B\neq\phi)$ ,
$g_{\lambda}(A\cup B)=g_{\lambda}(A)+g_{\lambda}(B)+\lambda g_{\lambda}(A)g_{\lambda}(B)$. (1)
Remark 1. The condition $\lambda>-1$ is necessary to satisfy the monotonicity.
Next we show the definition of the Choquet integral (G.Choquet[2], D.Schmeidler[4]),
Let $h(\cdot)$ be a real-valued function on $X$ satisfying
$h(x_{1})\geq h(x_{2})\geq\cdots\geq h(x_{n})$ . (2)
Moreover we put
$H_{i}=\{x_{1}, \cdots, x_{i}\}$ $(i=1, \cdots, n)$ . (3)
Deflnition 3. The right side of the following equation (4) ls called the Choquet integral
of a function $h(\cdot)$ on $X$ with respect to the fuzzy measure $g(\cdot)$ .
$(C) \int hdg=\sum_{i=1}^{n}[h(x_{i})-h(x_{i+1})]g(H_{i})$ (4)
where $h(x_{n+1})=0$ .
Remark 2. The Choquet integral (4) represents an area of the part under the function
$h(\cdot)$ , weighted by the fuzzy measure $g(\cdot)$ .
3 Numerical Example
We consider an election problem in a society consisted of ten members (voters). We
suppose that there are four altematives $A,$ $B,$ $C$ and D. We explain in detail step $1\sim$
step 6 in the case of member 3 as follows:
Step 1: We suppose that member 3 had enumerated three appraisal criteria $x_{1}$ (pledge),
$x_{2}$ (public opinion) and $x_{3}$ (political party).
Step 2: Letting member 3 carry out paired comparisons among criteria $x_{1},$ $x_{2}$ and
$x_{3}$ , we had obtained the result in Table 1. The weights of criteria can be ob-
tained by the geometric average (G.A.) method (for example, the G.A. of pledge
is $\sqrt[3]{1x3\cross 7}=2.759)$ . The weights in Table 1 are the standardizations of G.A. $s$ .
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Table 1. Paired comparisons and weights by member 3.
In general, when a paired comparison matrix is given by $A=[a_{ij}|i,j=1,$ $\cdots$
, $n]$ and its weight vector is given by $w=(w_{1}, \cdots, w_{n})$ , the consistency of paired
comparisons is well-known to be given by the consistency index
$C.I$ . $= \frac{1}{n-1}(\lambda_{\max}-n)$ (5)
where $\lambda_{\max}$ is the maximum eigenvalue of the matrix $A$ . In the case of the G.A.
method, $\lambda_{\max}$ is estimated by
$\frac{1}{n}\sum_{i=1}^{n}\frac{1}{w_{i}}\sum_{j=1}^{n}a_{ij}w_{j}$ .
It is well-known that the consistency holds if $C.I$ . $\leq$ 0.1 $\sim$0.15. In our numerical
example, $C.I.-arrow$ 0.031 and therefore the consistency of the paired comparisons in
Table 1 holds.
Step 3: The weight vector of appraisal criteria is given by
$w=c(O.649$ , 0.279, 0.072 $)$
where $c$ is a positive constant. Using the weight vector, we constitute a $\lambda$-fuzzy
measure $g_{\lambda}(\cdot)$ on the family of subsets of $X=\{x_{1}, x_{2}, x_{3}\}$ . We put
$g_{\lambda}(\{x_{1}\})=0.649c$ , $g_{\lambda}(\{x_{2}\})=0.279c$ , $g_{\lambda}(\{x_{3}\})=0.072c$ . (6)
$g_{\lambda}(\{x_{1}, x_{2}\})=0.928c+0.181\lambda c^{2}$
$g_{\lambda}(\{x_{2}, x_{3}\})=0.351c+0.020\lambda c^{2}$








where the last equality of the equation (10) is derived from $g_{\lambda}(X)=1$ in Definition
1.
But from relations (6) $\sim(10)$ only, two constants $c$ and $\lambda$ can’t be decided. Then we
ask member 3 his subjective weight of double appraisals $\{x_{1}, x_{2}\}=$ {pledge, public
opinion}. It is assumed that member 3 has answered the weight was 0.95. Then
$g_{\lambda}(\{x_{1}, x_{2}\})=0.95c$ . (11)
From the simultaneous equations (7), (10) and (11), we obtain
$c=0.971,$ $\lambda=0.125$ . (12)
Substituting (12) into (6) $\sim(9)$ , we can decide the $\lambda$-fuzzy measure as follows:
$g_{\lambda}(\phi)=0,$ $g_{\lambda}(X)=1$ (13)
$g_{\lambda}(\{x_{1}\})=0.63,$ $g_{\lambda}(\{x_{2}\})=0.27,$ $g_{\lambda}(\{x_{3}\})=0.07$ (14)
$g_{\lambda}(\{x_{1}, x_{2}\})=0.92,$ $g_{\lambda}(\{xx\})=0.34,$ $g_{\lambda}(\{x_{1}, x_{3}\})=0.71$ (15)
Step 4: We have gotten member 3 to mark all alternatives under each of criteria on a
maximum scale of 10 points and obtained the results in Table 2.
Table2. Appraisals of alternatives by member 3.
Step 5: By the definition (4) of the Choquet integral, comprehensive evaluations of
alternatives by member 3 are given by
$\mu_{A}=2x1+(4-2)\cross 0.71+(10-4)\cross 0.07=3.84$
$\mu_{B}=3\cross 1+(4-3)\cross 0.71+(5-4)\cross 0.63=4.34$
(16)
$\mu_{C}=0x1+(0-0)\cross 0.92+(0-0)\cross 0.63=0$
$\mu_{D}=1\cross 1+(4-1)\cross 0.34+(8-4)\cross 0.07=2.3$
Step 6: It is assumed that allotted points of member 3 are 10 points. Since each member
allocates his points in proportion to comprehensive evaluation, member 3 allocates
3.6, 4.2, $0,2.2$ points to altematives $A$ , B. $C,$ $D$ respectively.
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We deal with the case of other members by the same manner as above mentioned. We
abbreviate their details. Of course, the number and contents of criteria are selected freely
by each member. In order to compare the FSD procedure with the Borda procedure, we
suppose that the allotted points of all members are the same 10 points. Let’s assume
that the allocation of points by all members are given in Table 3. From Table 3 the
social preference order by the FSD procedure is $D\succ A\succ B\succ C$ where “ $a\succ b$ ” means that
alternative $a$ is preferred rather than $b$ .
On the other hand, appling the Borda procedure under the preference orders shown in
Table3, the allocations of points by all members are as Table 4. Then from Table 4 the
social preference order by the Borda procedure is $A\succ B\succ D\succ C$ .
Table4. The allocations of points by the Borda procedure.
Comparing the FSD procedure with Borda procedure, the results differ extremely in
the order of altemative D. It seems that the allocation of points by member 5 has a great
influence on the order of altemative D. In the case of the FSD procedure a member can
express his own preference freely. Since member 5 prefers alternative $D$ strongly, he
allocates all of his allotted points (10 points) to alternative D. On the other hand, in the
case of the Borda procedure a member is imposed to set his preference orders among
altematives, moreover the difference bteween neighbouring orders is always one. Then
the Borda procedure can’t represent strictly that member 5 prefers altemative $D$ very
strongly. In this meaning the FSD procedure can express the reality of preference better
than Borda procedure.
4 Discussion
We enumerate characteristics of the FSD procedure as follows:
(1) In the FSD procedure a member judges his own preferences consciously under evi-
dent criteria which are chosen freely by the member.
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(2) The FSD procedure weights criteria by accumulating paired comparisons. Moreover
its consistency is vcrified.
(3) Taking ambiguities in human judgements into consideration, the FSD procedure
uses a fuzzy integral in comprehensive evaluation of each alternative.
(4) Each member allocates his allotted points among alternatives in proportion to com-
prehensive evaluations. Then the strength of preference can be reflected directly.
(5) Though the majority rule considers the first alternative only in the preference order
of each member, the FSD procedure considers other alternatives too.
(6) Though the appraisal by $t\}_{1e}$ Borda procedure is relative, one by the FSD procedure
is absolute. Then the “ voting paradox “ doesn’t occur and even if the set of
alternatives varies, the preference orders among old alternatives are unchangeable.
(7) In a multi-valued society, discussions among members may change thier appraisal
criteria and their weights. The FSD procedure can reflect the change since criteria
are shown evidently in it.
(8) In the case of many alternatives it is difficult to mark relative preference order
by looking around all alternatives. But in the FSD procedure since a member
appraises each alternative under each criterion absolutely, the task is easier.
(9) But the FSD procedure compels each member to carry out considerable tasks.
On the whole, though the FSD procedure demands somewhat time and effort, it has
high use value since it can reflect opinions of all members as much a.s possible.
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